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ABSTRACT 
Several theories have been advanced to explain thel reduction 
in the number of competitive congressional districts during lh 
decade. Among these is Mayhew's theory, which attributes the 
to the increasing control of campaign resources by incumbenJs.
Ferejohn presents evidence which casts doubt on Mayhew's thJsi
this paper, Ferejohn's evidence is examined within the framJwo 
simultaneous equation model. I conclude that Mayhew's thesJs, 
bloodied by Ferejohn's attack, is still very much alive. 
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THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: 
MAYHEW MAY STILL BE RIGHT! 
Introduction 
A number of authors have presented evidence that since 1950, 
there has been a noticeable decline in the proportion of competitive 
Congressional districts. For example, Tufte [41 shows that there has 
been a decrease in the "swing ratio", that is, the likelihood that a 
1 percent shift in votes will cause a change in the outcome of an elec-
tion. Kostroski [8 1 and Erikson 51 confirm the casual observations by 
showing that there has been a substantial increase in the incumbency 
advantage in postwar Congressional elections. 
Three competing theories have been advanced to explain this 
phenomenon. The first is advanced by Tufte [41, who explains it by 
the incumbent manipulation of the redistricting schemes. He argues 
that "reapportionment rulings have given incumbents new opportunities 
to construct secure districts for themselves. " The second theory is 
due to Burnham [71. This one attributes the causes to a basic change 
in the behavior of the electorate. He points out that Tufte1s 
observation regarding the drop in swing ratio may be due to the 
decreasing salience of party identification in the voting decision of 
the individual. The third theory, advanced by Mayhew [21, attributes 
the causes to the more effective use of the institutional advantages 
of incumbency by the incumbents. He argues that increasing use of the 
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resources of the incumbency office, .such as the franking privile�e and 
publicity by the incumbent increased his salience,l which in th 
increased his share of the aggregate vote. I 
Ferejohn [31 finds himself in substantial agreement with 
, the theory of basic change in electorate behavior. He success(u:J.ly 
presents evidence against the theory of the incumbent manipul,tion 
of redistricting schemes by showing that the phenomenon of de,liµing 
competitiveness has occurred both in the states that have bee1
redistricted and in those that have not. He also argues against! the 
theory of institutional advantage of incumbency. 
This paper will show that both the theories of basic �h�nge in 
electorate behavior and institutional advantage of incumbency1m�y 
account for the change in voting behavior. It will first establish the
I relevancy of incumbency and candidate' s salience to the individual' s 
voting decision in a framework which recognizes the potential! effect 
of other variables, such as economic conditions. It will then 
lish and explore the interactive nature of incumbency and saJie
The various findings of this preliminary analysis will be usJd 
 motivate the form and variables of a simultaneous equations mod 
stab-
ce. 
0 
1 of 
electoral competition. This procedure is necessary in orderitol avoid 
ad hoc inclusion of variables and to reduce .the possibility of �ias 
due to simultaneity and misspecification. 
1candidate1s salience means his recognition by the vot 
Recognition and salience will be used interchangeably in thi� 
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The most general formulatio
n of the model establishes 
that both 
incumbency and salience have
 positive and significant e
ffects on voting. 
It further establishes that 
incumbency also works throu
gh the salience 
variable in influencing the v
oting decision of the indivi
dual. 
On The Theory of Institutional 
Advantages of Incumbency 
In a discussion of the kind
s of activities in which co
ngress-
4 
men find it electorally advan
tageous to engage, Mayhew id
entifies 
"advertising" as an effectiv
e activity in winning votes.
 His definition 
of "advertising" is simple: 
"It is any effort to dissemi
nate one',s name 
among constituents to create
 a favorable image, but in m
essages having 
little or no issue content."
 [2] Mayhew essentially agrees
 with 
Stokes and Miller's asserti
on [9], that "Recognition carri
es a posi­
�ive valence; to be perceived 
at all is to be perceived favo
rably. 11 
He further points out that i
ncumbents engaging in "stand
ard routines, " 
such as frequent visits to c
onstituency, nonpolitical sp
eeches, and 
correspondence with constitu
ents, will be better known t
han their 
challengers. The incumbent ca
n afford to engage in these 
"advertising" 
activities, because the publ
ic largely foots the bill, w
hile chal-
lengers must meet their own ex
penses. 
Thus Mayhew's model is simple:
 incumbency means greater co
ntrol 
of electoral resources, which
 in turn produces higher sali
ence of incum­
bents, which leads to greater 
incumbency voting. See Figu
re 1. 
+ 
Greater Control of 
Resources by Incumbents 
F:l,gure l 
Ferejohn on The Theory of 
Institutional Advantages of Incumbency 
ILLER 
Ferejohn [3] casts doubt on the theory of Institutidna 
Adv•nC•ge• nf Incumbency. Fn< chi• chen'Y en be �<<ecc, 11 mi>sc 
be true that: 1) there should be an overall increase in the ]evel  
J 
. of recognition of the incumbent; 2) the relative level of ric gnition 
of incumbents versus challengers should also show an increase 3) In-
·creased level (or relative level) of recognition translates I behavior-
ally into an increased level of incumbency voting • • • •  Howeve 
e•c.bli•h"' '"" '  1) ilie level nf incumb=cy vneing inm+
time; 2) this increase is not accompanied by increasing salle .  
incumbent over time; 3) increasing salience of both the incu 
the challenger may decrease the probability of voting in tjei 
, he 
over 
ce of the 
ent and 
favor. 
Essentially, he doubts that the Stokes/Miller link lislalways 
positive; he presents evidence that the link might sometimes 
negative [3]. He also denies the positive link between inJu 
salience. Ferejohn's model is shown in Figure 2. 
e 
ency and 
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Figure 2 
Preliminary Investigation of the Data 
. 
,, ? 
The task of this section is to probe the available data using 
simple statistical techniques to suggest the relevancy to the indivi-
dual's voting decision of various variables which are considered a pri-
ori as being relevant. It will also exposit the interaction between 
these variables. These findings will be used as motivation for the 
simultaneous equations model. Various indices will be extracted from 
the raw data in the SRC surveys (1956-1970) . These indices will then be 
used to make some tentative hypotheses and observations. 
Three categories of party affiliations will be considered: 
Democratic, Independent and Republican. Also considered will be three 
categories of respondents to the question regarding their perception of 
cnanges in economic.conditions; those who perceived "better" conditions, 
tnose who perceived the "same" conditions, and those who perceived 
"worsened" conditions. For this, use will be made of the following 
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question in the SRC survey: "During the last few years, has your finan­
cial situation been getting better, getting worse, or stayed the same?" 
For the salience variable, use will be made of a question in 
the SRC survey that asked the respondent to name the candidates for 
the H ouse in his district. If the respondent could name the candidate, 
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he was considered to recognise him; otherwise not. The limit,tion 
of our data is mainly due to the availability of recognition dat 
only for the 1958, 1964, 1966, 1968, and 1970 elections. 
The results are mainly reported in the Appendix, and the: 
Appendix tables have the labels A and B following the table nrer to 
distinguish them from the summary tables in the main text. Since it 
will be necessary to make some observations regarding the relati�e 
effect of certain variables over time, the differential valuel df these 
variables will be shown in the tables rather than their absolltd values. 
 For example, if a test is to be made that recognition of the injumbent is 
increasing over time relative to that of the challenger, then t e rele­
vant variable to observe over time is the differential recognit on of 
the incumbent: the percent recognizing the incumbent minus tte lpercent 
recognizing the challenger. This will simplify the form and innerence 
f<om the eu�•'Y t'1>1ee. Of inte<eet will be the numbe< of ertiie• in 
the original table with a positive or negative sign, the magnitJde of 
the entries (how positive or negative they are),  and the numblr lof cases 
that show increasing or decreasing entries over time. 
The Effect of Incumbency 
Ferejohn [3] demonstrates the influence of incumbency! orl the 
voting decision, contradicting an earlier finding by Kramer [10 
Kramer's model, however, eliminates some spurious effects by !con­
trolling for economic conditions and presidential coattails. 
I 
Table lA investigates the effect on the proportion of tbe 
Democratic yote of Democratic incumbency rather than Republidanl (Table 
lB exhibits the same effect
 on the proportion of the 
Republican vote) , 
controlling for different 
economic responses. 
Entries in Table lA are Democr
atic incumbency advantage, 
and are 
given by: proportion of pe
ople who voted Democratic in
 Democratic in-
cumbent district, minus pro
portion of people who voted
 Democratic in 
Republican incumbent dist
rict. Thus, positive entries
 imply positive 
effect of Democratic incumbe
ncy on the Democratic vote
. Moreover, the 
higher these entries are, t
he greater is the inferred 
effect of incum-
bencv on the share of vote
s. The evidence is summar
ized in Table 1 .  
Table 1 
Vote uifferentials uue to Incumb
ency: 
summary of the Entries in Table
s lA and lB 
Proportion of Proportio
n of 
Positive Differ- Cases Supp
orting 
entials in Tables Increas
ing Effect 
of Inc. 
Democratic 89 100 
Inc. lA 
Republican 72 so· 
Inc. lB 
JI = 42 n = 6 
Several observations may be made 
from Table 1:
8 
a) In general, the data supp
ort the contention of positiv
e 
and increasing effect of incu
mbency on voting. Only 17 p
ercent of all 
the cases show a negative ent
ry. This agrees with Ferej
ohn's finding [31. 
b) The Democratic share of v
otes is more sensitive to De
mocratic 
incumbency than is the Republ
ican share to Republican inc
umbency. This 
is shown by a higher proporti
on of large entries in Tabl
e lA than lB 
(there are 1 7  percent more entries w
hich are greater than 40 perdent in 
Democratic incumbency) . Moreover, the
 former shows increasing! effect of 
incumbency on voting. Hore than 80 percen
t of cases in this dattgory 
support this observation, while the
 picture for the Republicad s are of 
votes is not clear enough to reach
 a conclusion. 
There is other interesting information
 which may be ortained 
from the raw data in Tables lA and lB:
 
c) The people who perceive worseni
ng economic condit orts I 
(whether they vote Democratic or Rep
ublican) are the least like�y to be  
influenced by incumbency. For example
, in the case of Republican 
incumbency, 67 percent of the negat
ive entries fall in the 11wbr�e" 
category. 
d) Republicans seem to be the lea
st affected by their 
incumbency. 
Thus, it seems legitimate to inclu
de incumbency as a relevant 
in any further analysis of the que
stion under investigation. 
finding agrees, 
'in general, with Ferejohn's. 
The Effect of Candidate Salience 
1wn 
riable 
is 
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In this section, a search will be
 made for evidence l.n lsupport 
of the Stokes/Miller observation
: "to be perceived at all, lisl to be 
perceived favorably." The differentia
l salience of the other barty's 
candidate is calculated for those wh
o voted for the other plrt� candi­
date, controlling for party identific
ation (PID) and econo�cjresponse. 
See Table 2A. There is a similar ta
ble for those who voted l f r their own 
party candidate (Table 2B). Thus, entrie
s in Tables 2 are: he percent
 
of those who voted for candidate X and recogni
zed him, minus the percent 
of those who voted for X and recognized the other c
andidate. Hence, the 
more positive the entries in the table, the firme
r the inference regard-
ing the positive effect of salience on the cand
idate's vote. 
All entries are positive and reasonably l
arge, indicating some 
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positive correlation between salience and 
vote. Moreover, if 1958, 1964, 
and 1966 are regarded as the first period,
 and 1968 and 1970 as the 
second period, some weak inference can be 
drawn regarding the effect of 
salience over time; more than 50 percent o
f cases show increasing effect 
over time. This inference stays the same, whatev
er definitions are 
adopted for the first period and the secon
d period of analysis. More-· 
over, the data in Tables 2A and 2B show the rel
ationship between 
salience and voting to be more strongly positiv
e for the other 
party's candidate than for the candidate of the
 voter's party: 75 
percent of the cases in the former category sh
ow an increasing effect, 
while only 50 percent of the cases show such a 
trend for the latter 
category. Table 2 summarizes these findings. 
These tentative results indicate, to a certain 
extent, the 
existence of the Stokes/Miller link between salie
nce and vote. Thus, 
for the moment at least, it can be concluded that
 the salience of 
candidates is positively related to the voting d
ecision of the indi-
vidual voter. 
Differential 
Salience of 
Own Party 
In Its Vot:e 
Differential 
Salience of 
Other Party 
In Its Vote 
Salience and Incumbency 
Another Dimension 
Table 2 
Percent of 
Positive 
Entries 
100 
100 
Percent of Cases 
Increasing 
Over Time 
50 
75 
Most of the models dealing with the effect of salience o 
voting consider recognition of the candidates by the voter as lan1exog-
enous phenomenon beyond the rational calculus of the voter. 
r
e 
little effort has been expended to discover the underlying process 
behind the quest of the individual voter for knowledge of the lcatdi­
date's name. Knowledge and retention of this piece of informati n is  
not costless, hence there must be a process through which this erst is 
defrayed or compensated. Investigating this process helps to avrid 
simultaneity bias in specifications of models for voting. It al�o 
promises to enrich our knowledge of how various variables intera�t to 
effeoo che vncing deoi•inn. Mayh�'' [1] �plan•Cinn nf che jofPoipal 
source of decline in the number of competitive seats in Congr�ss1, 
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may be viewed as a model of "·defrayed cost. " See Figure 3. 
The Elements of the "Defrayed Cost" Model 
Figure 3 
Consider "salience" as a consumable political good with a 
positive "perceived" price that could be consumed in any quantity. 
This assumption is valid if salience is considered as a continuum, 
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starting from a mere recollection of the candidate's name to a 
comprehensive knowledge of his personality, achievements and background. 
However, only one level of recognition is observable, due to various 
institutional and experimental design considerations. Let g be the 
quantity of knowledge which an individual possesses about the candidate 
and k be the quantity of knowledge which corresponds to knowing the 
"name" only. Then 
if g �k we observe 1, 
an.1 if g �k we observe 0. 
Assume a neoclassical utility function (the assumption of diminishing 
marginal utility of information in this case is highly 
plausible) and a positive perceived price for information. The 
individual's maximization of this utility subject to his budglt 
i>traint will determine whether he will purchase .this politicJ1 
and how much he will consume. The.demand equation for g willl b 
D g = D g (Pl, P 2 • • •  Pg, . . .  Ph, I) 
, an 
con-
ommod;l.ty 
where I is the "income" of the individual. Thus, the greatei tile 
income, the higher the demand for this political good (unless an infe-
rior good is considered; in this case, the opposite is true) . Also, in 
the tradition of general equilibrium analysis, assuming all goons 
are gross substitutes, the lower the price of g, the greater lisl Dg [12]. 
Thus, salience should rise· if the incumbent low�cs the cost of·
information to the individual voter by making use of media ajd ub-
licizing his Congressional activities. 
Does the data capture this covariation of incumbencyland 
awareness1 Table 3A shows the incremental percentage of those 
 
recognize the Democratic candidate and reside in an area wit! 
incumbents over those who reside in an area with Republican in 
 
controlling for economic responses. For example, in 1958, tte 
tage of the Democrats in the "better" category who recognize t 
cratic candidate and reside in a district with a Democratic in 
I 
exceed those in the same category who reside in a district wit 
  Table 3A is summarized in ublican iasumbent by 89 .• 7 percent. 
rho 
emocratic 
umbents, 
percen-
e Demo-
umbent 
.a Rep.,. 
able 3. 
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Table 3 
Differential Salience of the Demo
cratic Candidate 
Due to His Incumbency 
Percent of Positive Percent of 
Entries Percent of Cases 
Entries (n = 15) Greater Tha
n 80 Increasing Over 
Percent (n = 1 5) Time (n = 3) 
100 60 
100 
The following tentative observation
s may be made: 
l) All entries are positive and exceptional
ly large, which 
confirms strong covariation between
 incumbency and salience. 
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2) There is some evidence to indic
ate an increasing effect of 
incumbency on salience over time, a
t least for the "better" response 
category. 
The conclusion [3] that there is no 
evidence of an increasing 
effect of incumbency on salience is n
ot substantiated. Hence, a major 
link in the theory of the institution
al advantage of incumbency remains 
unbroken. Ferejohn's contrary conclu
sion follows from a table which show
s 
no increase in the proportion of tota
l voters who recognize the incumbent.
 
The variable that should have been co
nsidered is the proportion who voted
 
for the incumbent, not the proportion
 of total registered voters. When 
considering total registered voters, 
Ferejohn's conclusion is not sur-
prising, since a higher proportion of 
those who don't vote cannot recall 
the name of the incumbent [13] . Admitt
edly, however, these initial 
results, like Ferejohn1s, are based on 
a small number of cases. 
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A preliminary model is formulated t
o test the relatioµshJip 
between salience of the Democrat
ic candidate and incumbency. 1THe
 model 
is of the form: 
RD = a + alEd + a2
D + a3R + Cl4ID 
+ u 
where 
Ed = 1 if respondent bas c
ollege degree 
= 0 otherwise 
D = 1 if respondent is a D
emocrat 
= 0 otherwise 
R=l if respondent is a 
Republican 
= 0 otherwise 
ID = 1 if the incumbent is a Democrat 
0 otherwise. 
A probit estimation procedure is
 used. The resultslar� reporte
d 
in Table 4. Education and incum
bency are significant in all 
while the party identification v
ariable is significant in ohlv one case, 
which corresponds to the respond
ent being Republican in thel 1 
election. The important item to
 notice, however, is that ihcrbency 
increases its significance and 
influence over time. This �s crucial 
link in the theory of institutio
nal advantage of incumben�J . as 
Ferejohn rightly observes. 
Table 4 
Equation for the Recognition of the Democratic Candidate 
Const. Education 
-0. 35 * 0. 28 * 
1958 
(0. 19) (0. 11) 
-0. 13 0. 30 * 
1964 
(0. 21) (0. 10) 
-0. 28 0. 32 * 
1966 
(0. 21) (0 . 12) 
-0. 25 0. 20 * 
1968 
(0. 18) (0.10) 
-0. 40 * 0. 44 * 
1970 
(0.20) (0. 11) 
� significant at 5 percent 
** significant at 10 percent 
Democrat Republican · Inc. Dem. 
0. 25 -0. 03 0,19**
(0. 20) (0. 20) (0. 10) 
0. 15 0. 02 0. 21* 
(0. 21) (0. 22) (0. 09) 
-0. 02 -0. 10 0. 45* 
(0. 20) (0. 21) (0. 11) 
0. 03 -0. 03 o. 72 * 
(0. 2) (0. 20) (0. 01) 
0. 02 -0. 43 * 0. 38* 
(0. 20) (0.19) (0. 11) 
Hence, there does exist some support for the "defrayed cost" 
model in this data. Incumbents provide information about their acti-
vities at a low cost to the electorate. This low cost information 
impinges on the individual voter randomly, affecting the later acqui-
sition of this information, which translates itself into higher incum-
bency voting. 
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Economic Condition and Salience 
Another possible model is to postulate that the salie
t
ca of the 
Congressional candidates increases if the individual voter is
l
eaonom­
ically worse off, once control is made for incumbency. This model will 
 be termed "the Avenger." That is, the individual voter is most llikely 
to incur the cost of information by seeking the candidates' n�es if he 
is hurt economically by the President's policies. Ferejohn frn4s that, 
of those who vote for their own party, a lower proportion are aware of 
the candidate's name. This may be due to the presence of a lower 
proportion of those whose conditions are worsened within that! g�oup. 
Table 4A tests this model by showing the covariation bflthe 
perception of economic conditions and salience. Specifically!, it shows 
the salience of the incumbent Congressman within each economi� tesponse 
catagory in two cases: 
a) When the incumbent Congressman belongs to the
party. 
b) When the incumbent Congressman belongs to the 
party. 
Pre[' i<ilent' s 
cha!llenger' s 
This will establish the presidential effect, if there if any. 
For example, in 1958 there are 87 . 5  percent Republicans in tJe l1better11 
category who recognize the incumbents from the presidential �arj:y. 
Define Pb as the salience of candidate X in the "better', r�sponse etter 
category, and Pworse as the salience in the "worse" response 1caj:egory • .
worse - better 
The model is supported if P > P for salierice
l
of the 
Congressional candidates. The evidence in Table 4A seems to lin icate 
some covariation between salience of candidates and economiclpe�ception. 
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The support for the model i
s also satisfactory, since 70 pe
rcent of 
all the cases support the 
model. The support for the 
model is the 
case of the presidential pa
rty candidates is overwhelm
ingly stronger 
than the case of the challe
ngers. 
Thus, economic conditions sh
ould be included as a releva
nt 
variable in any further inves
tigation of the salience var
iable. Tb.ere 
is some evidence in support o
f both the "defrayed cost m
odel" and 
"the Avenger" model. 
Next, some of Ferejohn's evid
ence will be examined. His 
conclusion is that "controlli
ng for incumbency status, in 
four of 
ten comparisons, increased re
cognition of his own party can
didate 
actually decreased the probab
ility of voting for him! 11 Th
is con­
clusion, however, does not agr
ee with the results of his ear
lier 
model without interaction terms b
etween salience and incumbency [3
]. 
For example, the regression resul
ts of his model show that the re
cogni­
tion of the Democratic candidate 
is positively significant for all
 
elections, and that for the Repu
blican candidate is positively s
ignif­
icant for all elections exce
pt that of 1966. His model also
 shows 
that incumbency is positivel
y significant in all the cas
es except that 
of 1958. See Table SA. Ferejo
hn suggests estimating a mor
e saturated 
version of his model by inclu
ding interaction variables be
tween 
incumbency and salience. He
nce, the following model is e
stimated.
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y a+ bl + b2I +b3R + b4RI + u 
Y is the voting variable 
where Y 1 if vote Democrat 
= 0 otherwise • 
P is the party identif:.cation variable 
p 
[::] 
where P1 = 
1 if respondent is Democrat
p2
0 otherwise 
1 if respondent is Republican 
0 otherwise.
I is the incumbency variable
I = 1 H incumbent is Democrat
0 otherwise. 
R is the salience variable 
R = 1 if recognize Democrat candidate 
0 otherwise. 
R I is the salience/incumbency 
Table 5 shows the results of.this regression: 
19 
58 
64 
66 
68 
70 
Table 5 
Vote for the Democratic Candidate A Saturated 
Version of Ferejohn's Model 
CONST. RI pl P., I R 
-0,57* -0. 04 1.50* -1. 0* 0. 47* 0. 36* 
(0. 21) (0. 25) (0. 21) (0. 21) (0.18) (0. 15) 
0. 25 0. 11 0. 52* -1. 3* 0. 53* 0. 08 
(0.23) (0. 21) (0. 23) (0. 23) (0. 16) (0. 14) 
-0. 65* 0. 47* 1. 0* -0. 91* -. 66* -0. 02 
(0. 23) (0. 26) (0. 21) (0. 22) (0. 18) (0. 20) 
-0. 62* -0. 21 0. 86* -0. 85* 0. 60* 0. 46* 
(0. 19) (0. 22) (0. 19) (0. 20) (0.17) (0.14) 
-0. 74* -0. 26 1. 20* -1. 30* 1. 30* 0. 36* 
(0.22) (0. 28) (0. 21) (0. 22) (0. 20) (0. 18) 
The model supports Ferejohn's observation that the incumbency 
variable exhibits a significant and increasing effect on vote. 
However, the model also shows that the recognition variables have a 
similar trend in the later part of the period. To establish the 
significance of the recognition terms, a likelihood ratio test is 
conducted and the null hypothesis is rejected at 5 percent for all 
elections. However, this model is so riddled with multicollinearity 
that some interaction terms are bound to lose their sign stability and 
that all coefficients of the model are suspect. 
The lesson learned from the previous exercise is that a single 
equation formulation that has both recognition and incumbency variables 
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as independent variables is not suitable for answering this inqu:f.ry on 
two grounds: first, the true model is susceptible to multicoJliµearity; 
second and more seriously, it is established that the model iJ mtt.s­
specified under the most general assumptions regarding the inJeraction 
of salience and incumbency.  Finally, the model formulated by Ferejohn does not disprbve 
that an adequate distributional shift in party identifiers maJ a�count 
I for the observable change in the pattern of voting. His model wlas of 
the form: 
Vote; o(PID, Rec, PID•Rec) + u. 
It follows from the evidence presented in this paper that 
is a 
eeping 
recognition is driven in part by incumbency and that incumbenry 
significant factor in explaining the voting behavior. However,
Ferejohn's model relegates incumbency to the error terms whilj 
the recognition variable as an explanatory variable. This renders 
the model misspecified and casts doubts on the interpretation! and 
significance of the variables in the model. 
The Model and Estimation Procedure 
The information in the previous tables are certainly lsu 
but firm conclusions have to await further evidence which ta�es 
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data provides a reasonable basis to establish relevancy of lthe various 
factors to the individual voting decision. 
shown, given the limitations of data and of 
the salience of candidates, incumbency, and 
For example, it �aslbeen 
tabulation techn,qu�, that
to a lesser degr�e,I the 
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individual's perception of hi
s economic lot are related to
 the voting 
decision. Moreover, it has b
een shown that incumbency and
 economic 
perception are related to th
e salience of the candidate. 
It remains to formulate a mod
el that captures the most cri
tical 
relevant variables on the one
 hand and takes into conside
ration the si-
,multaneous nature of the pol
itical phenomena on the other
. This kind of 
formulation improves on the 
specification of previous mo
dels and reduces 
simultaneity bias; it will al
so exposit the primary and se
condary in­
fluences of various variables
 on the individual's vote. 
A two-
equation model will be formul
ated. The first equation wil
l have the 
voting for presidential party
 candidates as a dependent va
riable, and 
the salience of the president
ial party candidate, percepti
on of economic 
conditions, incumbency, and p
arty affiliation as explanato
ry variables. 
The second equation will have
 the salience of the presiden
tial party 
candidate as dependent variab
le, and incumbency, interacti
on between 
perception of economic conditi
ons and party ID, education, an
d party 
identification as explanatory v
ariables. 
uowever, Mayhew's interpret
ation of the powers of the 
incumbency 
office may be restrictive. S
uch powers include, in addi
tion to the 
advantages of the label of i
ncumbency and use of the fr
anking priv-
ileges, the opportunities to
 do more services for the c
onstituencies. 
In this case, the ppportunit
ies given to Congressmen by 
the incumbency 
office to render services to
 their constituencies increa
ses the more 
the Congressmen remain in of
fice. The model, as it sta
nds, measures 
the overall effect of the pow
ers of the incumbency office
, viewed from 
this wider interpretation of these powers. H
owever, the observ 
rise in the effect of incumbency on salience ma
y be due not oh1 
the increasing power of the incumbency office, 
but also to tJe 
ing efficiency of long-time incumbents in usin
g these powers. 
.ble 
to 
ncreas-
n this 
case, it may be advantageous to include two va
r�ables in thelsalience 
equation: the dichotomous variable, I, measure
s the power of tbe 
I 
incumbency office, and a continuous variable, It
' measures tie !accu-
mulated learning of incumbents. This modifica
tion may affecf some of 
the results reported in this paper, and shed f
urther light on dhe effect 
of inoumbenoy in <he eleotoral prooee•, but 
we leave it to ftture 
::::��;,.:�:::: :::: ::':.:·::�::�:·::·::: ::::,
e
:�,::�:
t
:::.,,, 
are obtained. 
The Model 
Y1 "' 1 if a1 
+ bl + b2I1 + b3 cna) + b 4 cnw) + b5 (Rtl)
+ b6(RW) + b7(W) 
+ b8(IW) + b9(R1) + e1 >ii O 
0 otherwise 
Rl
"' 1 if R = a2 + c1P + c2I1 + 
c3E + c4(Dtl) +
 c5(DW) 
"' 
+ c6(Rtl) + c7
(RW) + cs(Itl) + Cg(IW) � K 
= 0 otherwise 
a.10 a similar equatiou for R2 
where: 
y is the voting variable 
(1) 
(2) 
i.e. y 1 if voting for the presidential party
 cand�date 
= 0 otherwise . 
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R is the salience variable 
[::] 
where: R1 = l if recognize the Presidential party candidate 
= 0 otherwise. 
F is the economic response variable 
where: 
F' 
• 
�:1 
Fl l if the response is "better" 
0 otherwise 
F2 "' l if the response is "same" 
0 otherwise 
F3 = l if the response is "worse" 
= 0 otherwise. 
P is the party identification variable 
p 
[::
1 
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where: P1 = 1 if the respondent is Democrat 
0 otherwise 
p
2 1 if the respondent is Republican 
0 otherwise 
P3 = 1 if Independent 
"' 0 otherwise . 
I is the incumbency variable 
11 = l if the President�al party candidate is indumbent 
= 0 otherwise. 
E is the education variable 
E = 1 if the respondent has college degree 
= 0 otherwise. 
The' interaction terms are 
DIS "' 1 if the voter is Democrat and perceived r'better" 
conditions 
0 otherwise 
DW 1 if Democrat and perceived "worsened" conditions 
"' O otherwise 
R!S 1 if Republican and perceived "better" cdndli.tions 
0 otherwise 
RW"' 1 if Republican and perceived "worsened"lconditions 
0 otherwise 
Its = 1 if Independent and perceived "better" conditions 
0 otherwise 
andE1, 
E
2 are random components. 
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In every variable, one category is not included in the actual 
regression model to avoid overidentification. Notice that the formu­
lation of the model allows pooling of data from several elections to 
nail down the effect of some crucial variables. As has been indicated, 
the data used is SRC (1956-1970) election data. 
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Although the salience variable R is observable as dichotomous, 
� 
it will be assumed to reflect a continuous variable R, with a threshold 
k such that 
� 
R> k.:>R"'l , 
R'.< k.:>R"'O· (3) 
This assumption will facilitate using a two-step probit estimation 
procedure. Equations (2) and (3) define a standard probit model; 
coefficients of (2) can be estimated by maximum likelihood procedure. 
� 
These estimated coefficients are used to construct R, which can be 
used as an instrument to replace R in (1) .  The rest of the estimating 
procedure proceeds analagously to the two-stage least square [15]. 
A two-stage probit technique is used in estimating the model 
for individual elections and for pooled runs. All tests of signi-
ficance are conducted at the 5 percent level of confidence. 
A word of caution has to be added here. It has been shown that 
in the second stage of such procedures, the standard errors of the 
coefficients are not consistent [14]. This makes the distribution of 
the ratio of the coefficients to their standard errors not t exactly. 
Therefore, the conclusion of significance derived from the inspection 
of these ratios has to be taken with this fact in mind. 
Results 
The Salience Equation. Table 6 shows the result of 
sion of the first equation. The following observations may 
1. Incumbency is positive and significant in all eie 
::::�:,:::�::,
l
:�,
·
::::�:,��f:��-
up
T:::.
�
�
n
:,::
·
:�d 
incumbency increased in influence towards the end of the peti 
dered. This is a crucial step in Mayhew's argument,. which le 
be supported by these findings. 
2. Except for two cases, that of "Dembet" in 1970 an 
regres-
made: 
ooling of 
nee that 
d consi-
to 
"Indworse" in 1 958, the coefficients of economic conditionsl atle not 
significant and do not possess sign stability in the equation lfor the 
salience of the presidential party candidate. 
3. 
4. 
pooled runs. 
Party identification does not have any effect ot salience. Education is significantly positive in all electidns and in 
A modified equation for the salience of the challenr' et's party 
candidate, where no interaction terms are included, is run. Table 7 
shows the results of this regression. The above findings a�e lfirmly 
supported. 
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Table 6 
Salience of the Pres,bential Party Candidate 
DEM BET 
I CONST. DEM REP INC DEM WOR REP BET REP WOR IND BET IND WR ED bl b� b3 
I al 1 b2 14 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9 
S.E S.E S.E S.E S.E 
I 
S.E 
I 
S.E S.E S.E S.E S.E 
0.15 0.16 0.35* 0.18 I -0.51• -0.62* p.01 0.3 -0.07 0.09 o. 35*58 I 0.18 0.19 0.2 0.07 0.1 10.1 0.29 0.31 0.12 0.17 0.08 
-0.14 0.17 0.35 -0.08 -0.002 I -0.48 -0.52 -0.05 -0.13 0.28* 10.01 
64 
0.13 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.07 0.1 0.33 0.4 0.14 0.22 0.09 
-0.6* -0.06 0.1 0.23* -0.1 �0.01 -0.35 -0.29 -0.15 -0.07 0.50* 
66 /0.13 0.19 0.2 0.2 0.09 0.12 0.27 0.3 0.16 0.16 0.10 
-o. 36 0.004 0.1 0.42* -0.06 .  -0.26 -0.40 -0.1 -0.2 0.27* 10.05 68 
0.14 0.2 0.2 0.22 0.08 0.11 0.28 o. 32 0.14 0.17 0.09 
-0.75* 0.21 -0.05 0.44* -o. 36*  0.04 0.07 0.10 0.19 0.63* 70 10.13
0.16 0.18 0.19 0,08 0.13 0.12 0�25 0.23 0.16 0.16 0.09 
64 -0.26 0.08 0.20 0.18* -0.007 I -0.04 -0.17 -0.36 -0.44 0.27* .& 1o.o4....__ 68 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.05 0.07 0.1 0.1 0.13 0.21 0.25 0.06 
CONST. 
* -0. 75 
1958 
(0.20) 
* -0.64 
1964 
(0.22) 
* -0.41 
1966 
(0.19) 
0.14 
1968 
(0.18) 
* -0.38 
1970 
(0.19) 
Table 7 
Equation for the Recognition 
of the Challenger's Party 
EDUCATION DEMOCRAT REPUBLICAN 
** * 0.18 0.17 0.42 
(0.11) (0.20) (0.21) 
* 0.40 -0.11 0.23 
(0.10) (0.22) (0.22) 
* 0.29 -0.04 0.25 
(0.12) (0.20) (0.21) 
* 0.48 -0.31 -0.18 
(0.10) (0.19) (0.19) 
* * 0.60 . -0.40 -0.24 
(0.12) (0.19) (0.20) 
29 
INC. REP. 
* 0.80 
(0.09) 
* 0.92 
(0.09) 
* 0.36 
(0.12) 
* 0.19 
(0.09) 
* 0.79 
(0.11) 
The Voting Equation 
ion Table 8 shows the results of regressing the first equa 
 
ions may 
of the model using the computed values of the salience variabl 
first step of the estimation procedure. The following obse�a 
from the 
be made. 
1. Except in 1 958, where it also p�cks up the wrongl slgn, 
incumbency is positive and significant. Pooling data estab�s es this 
observation firmly. There is also some evidence in support lof 
Ferejohn's· assertion that the incumbency effect is greater �ur}ng off-
year elections than in on-y ear elections [3]. 
2. Except for the 1 964 election, salience has a pos'it}ve, sig­
nificant effect on voting. Pooling the data, however, seems1 to indicate 
that the effect is primarily during off-year elections. Th�s fs perhaps 
due to the "drowning" of the effect of salience by the presildehtial coat­
tail effect. Moreover, there is some evidence that salience e:khibits an
increas�ng effect on voting. This finding, and the previou1 ohe tbat 
indicates that incumbency exerts increasing influence on salieµce, 
strengthen Mayhew's argument.2 
3. The pattern of signs for the economic condition�/p�rty affi-
liation interaction terms is confusing and does not support !any positive 
or negative hypotheses about their effect on voting. 
2In reference to the observation, made earlier, regard�g the 
lack of consistency of the standard errors of the coefficiedts in the 
second stage, it is reassuring to note the absence of sign Ano lies 
in these coefficients. Moreover, the fact that what is of fnt
here is trends over time rather than individual significanccl o 
coefficients. 
30 
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Table 8 
Voting Equation 
DEM REP INC DEM BET DEM woJ REP BET REP WOR IND BET IND WR REG 
cl 
.. b3 b4 b5 I b6 b7 be b9 blO a2 cl 
S.E S.E S.E S.E S.E S.E S.E S.E S.E S.E S.E 
-0.13 -1.4* 0.74* -0.12 +0.44* -0.11 0.003 0.27 -0.29* 0.64* 0.9* 
58 
0.27 0.27 0.23 0.13 0.2 0.26 / 0.32 0.36 0.13 0.21 0.29 
-0.19 0.36 -0.94* 0.21* -0.009 -0.02/ -0.4 0.16 0.30 -0.09 0.15 
64 
0.26 0.27 0.3 o.os 0.1 0.14/ 0.36 0.42 0.16 0.27 0.33 
-0.1* 0.97* -0.31 0. 36'1r -0.09 -0.11/ 0.34 0.34 0.04 0.36 0.43* 
66 
0.24 0.22 0.25 0.1 0.12 0.13 0.3 0.33 0.2 0.20 0.19 
0.45* 0.44* -0.71* 0.13 0.09 -0.lf -0.33 -0.33 0.16 -0.27 0.49* 
68 
0.22 0.21. 0.23 0.17 0.11 0.13 0.32 0.37 0.19 0.24 0.24 
-0.66* -0.91* 0.61* 0.45* I 0.25 0.02 -0.69* -0.38 +o.05 0.15 0.58* 
70 
0.2 0.22 0.20 0.11 o. 2' 0.19 0.33 0.26 0.15 o.r6 0.15 
64 -0.40* 0.42* -0.79* 0.24* 0.06 0.14· -o.o� -0.22 -0.33 -0.26 0.24 
& 
68 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.17 0.24 0.27 0.24 
I 
On examining the evidence presented in these tab
les, the 
following observations may be made from Tabl
es 8 and 9: 
I. There is a slight increase in the coefficient o
f incumbency 
in the equation for votes of candidates of the
 presidential party. 
2. There is also a slight increase in the co
efficient of 
saliency of the candidate of the presidential 
party in the vote 
equations. 
3. Almost all·of these coefficients are sign
ificant and 
positive (Table 9).
4. There is a slight increase in the coefficien
t of incumbency 
in the saliency equation for presidential party 
candidate equation. 
The second and third observations do not 
support Ferejohn's [ 3] 
contention of Mayhew's theory. The link bet
ween the increasing 
significance of incumbency voting and the in
creasing salience of the 
incumbent must be broken in order to sustain
 objections to Mahyew's 
theory. 
However, the fourth observation shows that i
ncumbency is 
increasing in significance even when salience
 is controlled. This 
means that the Ferejohn-Burnham theory of bas
ic change in the 
electorate behavior may also be right. 
It is the conclusion of this paper that Mayh
ew's theory is not 
defeated. It must therefore await further evi
dence to either 
substantiate it or to discard it. Further, it
 is found that both the 
theories of institutional advantage of incumbe
ncy and basic change in 
electorate behavior account for a significant 
part of the decline of 
competition in Congressional elections. 
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A more direct examination of the problem posed by May�ew is 
still desirable. Such examination involves the inclusion orl ¢ampaign 
expenditure and duration o f  incumbency in both equations of t 
A better specified model may even involve adding a third eqration for 
incumbency. While such modifications may affect some of the tesults . I reported in this paper, it is proper to point out that the specification 
in this paper is dictated by both theoretical and practical! c�nsider-
ations posed by the availability of data. 
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Table 1B 
Republican Incumbency Advantage 
"Better" 
� *56 58 *60 62 *64 66 *68 70 
+ DEMOCRAT 10.0 68.6 -42.9 - 371.o 23.0 25.0 77. 8
INDEPENDENT 51. 7 50.0 -25.0  33.4 87.5 50.0 ++-- 4�.5
REPUBLICAN 30.9 41. 6 10.0 - t 3.5 -16.9 29.8 10.5 
"Worse" 
� *56 58 *60 62 *64 66  *68 70 
DEMOCRAT 30.0 20.0 -9.0 - -20.0 42.8 38.1 90.0 t 
I 
t INDEPENDENT -14.2 20.0 -100.0 - 100.0 -50.0 25.0 80.0 I 
I 
REPUBLICAN 50.0 45.3 -17.7 - 24.1 -12.8 -10.0 6.9 t 
Entries are: Proportion of people who voted Republican in Republican incumbent 
district -proportion of people who voted Republican in Democratic 
incumbent district. 
* on-year Congressional elections 
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Table 2A 
lST PERIOD 2ND Pb R OD 
58 64 66 68 I 70 
DEMOCRAT/BETTER 17.1 10.0 19.2 17.1 44.4 + 
DEMOCRAT/WORSE 60.0 20.0 42.9 23.8 45.5 t 
REPUBLICAN/BETTER 15.0 11.5 46.2 14.3 62.5 + 
REPUBLICAN/WORSE 25 0 31.5 28.6 I 14.3 + 
Entries are: among the people who voted for the othel p arty 
candidate (percent recognize other part' c andidate -
percent recognize own party candidate) . 
Table 2B 
lST PERIOD 2ND �EI IOD 
58 64 66 68 I 7 0  
DEMOCRAT/BETTER 22.9 25.5 23.8 15.8 4.5 t 
DEMOCRAT/WORSE 22.7 28.0 31.6 26.9 38.2 + 
REPUBLICAN/BETTER 23.2 2.8 8.5 2i.1 19.0 + 
REPUBLICAN/WORSE 25.0 13.8 10.9 5.0  24.0 t 
Entries are:  among the people who voted for their own 1 iarty 
candidate 'percent recognize own party fa �didate -
percent recognize other party candidate). 
Table 3A 
Salience and Incumbency (in Democr
atic Candidacy) Effect 
on PID's Controlling for Economic Co
nditions 
"Better" 
� 
58 64 66 68 
70 
Democrat 89.7 88.4 
85.3 82.2 100 
Independent 60.0 25.0 50 .0 100 100
Republican 100 62.5 70 .0 66.6 100 
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Entries are: 
�roportion recognizing the) 
Democratic candidates in an 
area with Democratic 
incumbents 
�roporei� reeogn1'ing eh� 
Democratic candidate in an 
area with Republican 
incumbents 
Table 4A: Salience and Economic Conditions I 
eco re,. �O'.P.%1".(;'""l4' 
o...vO'ec 
BETTER 
SAME 
WORSE 
*58 
87.5 
88.9 100 
*64 
81. 3 
94.1 100 
*66 
80 
88.9 100 
68 
83.3 
77.8 
62.5 
11<70 
t
3.6 
5.0 
i 1 0 
Entries are: proportion of Republicans recognizing the rlctlmbents 
of the presidential party. 
Differential Salience of the Challenger's Pa�t' 
Incumbent Candidate Among the Republicans 
,¢"� J-_p_ �O'.P.�l';1�4' 04'_s,�c" 
BETTER 
SAME 
WORSE 
·"'58 
. 70 
93.3 
100. 
7; 64 
85. 7 
94� 7. 
100 
-
66 68 
I 17.8 l 89.5 
I 
&7.5 
I 
·94.7 
70.0 62.5 
Entries are as defined above for the challenger party. 
*Supports the "Avenger Model." 
• 70
I 191. 7 
11100.0. 
1100.0 
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Table SA 
Ferejohn's Model, Reestimated Using Probit 
CONST. DEMOCRAT REPUBLICAN RI RD 
* * * * 
-0.12 1.5 -0.98 -0.28 0.81 
1958 
(0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.13) (0.17) 
* * * * * 
0.78 0.52 -1.3 -0.40 0.44 
1964 
(0. 23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.11) (0.13) 
* * * * 
0.15 0.99 -0.91 -0.73 0.74 
1966 
(0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.16) (0.17) 
* * * * * 
-0.61 0.82 -0.89 0.33 0.83 
1968 
(0. 2) (0.19) (0.2) (0.11) (0.15) 
* * * * * 
0.49 1.2 -1.3 -0.81 0.73 
1970 
(0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.16) (0.18) 
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RR 
* 
-0. 72 
(0.18) 
* 
-0.53 
(0.14) 
* 
-0.81 
(0.17) 
* 
-0. 7.0 
(0.14) 
* 
-0.99 
(0.19) 
1 .  
2. 
3. 
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